The History of Canadian Business: A Reply by Naylor, R.
The History of Canadian Business: A Reply 
by R.T. NAYLOR* 
To Respond to Michael Bliss's review of The History of Canadian 
Business 1 is a difficult chore, not because the criticisms posed have any 
intrinsic merit - they have none - but because they are structured in 
a largely incoherent way. A complete reply to what are presumably the 
main points of his argument would require first a precise definition of these 
points: it would thus require one to undertake the roles of critic and 
respondent alike. Since Bliss's critique makes no effort to come to grips 
in a consistent way with the basic premises of an argument, since it con-
sists of a series of more or less random assertions, then, short of writ-
ing his critique for him, the only way to respond is to examine individually 
what seem to be his principal assertions. 
Bliss commences by getting himself throughly confused over the 
nature of "rationality" and "irrationality" in economic decision making. 
The argument is not about whether or not individual businessmen tried 
to make money (presumably they did), but rather about the economic 
and social framework within which they made their investment decisions. 
From a social point of view what is important is that the sum total of 
businessmen's decisions produced a certain pattern of investment behav-
iour that sustained the staple-extracting bias of the Canadian economy 
and encouraged the reliance on foreign capital. That is all there is to the 
matter. Presumably Bliss would not deny that the Canadian economy has 
a staple-extracting bias, nor that it is heavily dependent on foreign capital, 
nor that businessmen make investment decisions. If so, then I fail to see 
how he can disagree with the inference that the aggregate of business 
investment decisions in Canada produced the results described above. 
There are other difficulties in his argument that arise from his appa-
rent inability to perceive the qualitative distinction between the criteria 
for appraising individual decisions and the criteria for appraising the social 
consequences of the total of individuals' decisions. This inability is presu-
mably the result of his strict adherence to the tenets of liberal social 
science that often tend to identify the well-being of the part with the well-
being of the whole. However Bliss should be informed that even in so 
empty a discipline as neo-classical micro-economics, the distinction 
between individual and social welfare is fully appreciated. Further on this 
matter, Bliss has made a serious error in the specification of which vari-
ables are exogenous and which are endogenous, by virtue of his attempt 
to argue in terms of businessmen's decisions without reference to the socio-
economic context within which those decisions were taken. My argument 
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was not that investing in the perpetuation of a staple extracting economy 
was "irrational" (on his definition of the term); quite the converse. This 
is exactly the pattern of investment behaviour one would expect given 
that the horizons of business decision making in Canada were circumscri-
bed by Canada's objective position as a staple-extracting hinterland of the 
British empire. That position in the international economy is primary: bu-
siness decisions in Canada reflected the country's status as an economic 
dependency. The scope within which business decisions can be made de-
pends on the broader economic context. Given a range of possible deci-
sions dictated from outside the system, businessmen make their profit 
maximising choices. What I have done in the book is to attempt to ex-
plain why "rational" decision making on the part of business in Canada 
would lead to the perpetuation of a staple-extracting, foreign dominated 
economy. 
Bliss confuses the issue even further when he states that "by defini-
tion the explanation would have to involve a failure of entrepreneurship". 
As a minimum it is surely not too much to expect that someone setting 
out to write a critical review of a book would first read the book. Surely 
Bliss has done so. Yet in the concluding chapter of the book (Vol. II, 
p. 283) the following passage addressed itself to exactly the point Bliss 
raises . 
... the phrase 'lack of entrepreneurship' is sheer obfuscation. For entrepreneurs 
are the product of their social context. If by deficiency of entrepreneurship 
it is meant that American industrial capitalism possessed some special attributes 
permitting it to take advantage of productive opportunities which Canadian capi-
talism in the particular period did not, then the explanation is tautological, 
and thus trivial insofar as it fails to make specific reference to the objective 
social conditions of the period, especially the pattern of dependence. 
Many of the same type of errors flaw his criticisms of my treatment 
of the National Policy Tariff. His attempt to deny the validity of the 
distinction between two business groups by reference to their social 
origins is simply baffling. He tries to refute my discussion of the merger 
movement in Canadian business on the grounds that it incorrectly stresses 
the importance of the 1907 tariff revision. Bliss's statement, "the tariff 
was not revised upward in 1907" is indeed a curious one. Is Michael 
Bliss, noted historian of Canadian business, unaware of the fact that the 
1907 tariff revision was the most important and sweeping since the Nation-
al Policy, laying down a structure that remains basic to the Canadian 
tariff today? 2 Or is he simply contending that the revision of 1907 did not 
result in further protection? Assuming, charitably, that it is the second, 
Bliss is arguing that a government sits down to enormously complicate 
its tariff schedule, as it did in 1907, in order to induce greater freedom of 
trade! 3 Curiously enough others seem to share my view that the 1907 
2 See for example, J.H. PERRY, Taxes, Tariffs, and Subsidies Vol. I (Toronto: 
1955), p. 104. 
3 Interestingly enough O.J. McDIARMID in his Commercial Policy in the Canadian 
Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: 1946) while not taking sides on the issue of greater or less 
protection in so many words, points out a series of increases in the schedule, in some iron 
and steel items, boots and shoes and others. Moreover he states (p. 220) that "In 1907 the 
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revision constituted on balance an upward movement in the incidence of 
the tariff. E.C. Porritt, whose views Bliss elsewhere in his critique cites 
with approval, even to the point of the ultimate accolade of comparing his 
views to those of Michael Bliss himself, in his fascinating book, The 
Revolt in Canada Against the New Feudalism (London: 1911) states of 
the merger movement in Canada that it was "a new development in tariff, 
industrial, and financial economy which began just as soon as promoters 
realised that at the revision of 1907 more protection was given to many 
industries (p. 38)". 
He further alleges that my argument "errs in systematically over-
stating the number of manufacturers who opposed the tariff, but is surely 
right in implying that the ultimate inability of Canadian manufacturing to 
compete was caused by the tariff.'' Taking the latter point first, I must 
protest that, contrary to Bliss, this is (surely wrong! Once again exogenous 
and endogenous factors have been badly confused in Bliss's mind. The 
tariff is not simply a cause of a certain business structure: it is also, to 
a considerable degree, an effect of that structure. A considerable amount 
of time is devoted in the book to trying to show how businessmen dictated 
tariff structures in their own interest. To take the tariff as a strictly exo-
genous factor in the evolution of the Canadian business structure implies 
a certain view of the relations of government and business, i.e., the neu-
trality of the state, which Bliss evidently believes to be true, but which 
I find totally unacceptable. This fundamental divergence of opinion on the 
role of the state and the influence of big business on it, which I tried to 
make clear in my review of Michael Bliss's A Living Profil 4 several months 
ago, affects many of Bliss's criticisms of my position. 
As to the question of pro and anti-National Policy forces in the 
manufacturers' camp, their relative importance is a matter of opinion. I 
was intrigued however by Bliss's assertion that my emphasis on dissenting 
manufacturers is "unrecognizable", drawn as it is from "dubious, highly 
partisan" sources. If this emphasis is "unrecognizable" in light of other 
literature, then that seems to simply imply it is a new hypothesis. Am I 
then being taken to task for suggesting something new, instead of just 
reiterating what is already well established in the literature, if not in the 
facts of the business history of Canada? Or is the problem mainly one of 
sources? As to sources, Bliss busily berates me for using the "dubious, 
highly partisan" Globe and neglecting the presumably accurate, non 
partisan publications of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association ! Paren-
thetically, I might point out that many, if not most of the sources from 
which !arrived at a judgement on the importance of continued dissent from 
one third differential between British preference and general duties .... was definitely aban-
doned" with a result that "detracted from the value of the preference," i.e. raised the 
tariff rate. It is interesting too that many reductions were on inputs into the industrial pro-
cess. In the absence of reductions of the duty on output the result of these cuts would be, 
as is well known in economic literature, to raise the effective rate of protection implicit in 
the constant nominal tariff rates. 
4 Tom NAYLOR, "Bliss and Vinegar: A Review," This Magazine, Vol. 10, N • .4. 
(August-September, 1976). 
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the high tariff policy, including articles in the "dubious, highly partisan" 
Globe, were found by checking footnote sources in a then unpublished 
University of Toronto history Ph.D. thesis entitled, A Living Profit. 
Bliss next takes issue with my treatment of bank failures, claiming 
that "his distorted comparison with the United States, in which he only 
counts American national banks means nothing". Curious, I thought, as 
I read that passage, and immediately turned to Volume I, p. 119 where 
I found an analysis of failure rates of Canadian banks for the 1867-1914 
period followed by the statement, " ... over the roughly equivalent period 
from 1863 to 1907, the American banking system, with the reputation 
for extreme instability showed a failure of all banks of 221/2" . It is worth 
noting that the italics are in the original. The argument went on to say 
that the best comparison is between American, National and Canadian 
federally chartered banks, but nonetheless the complete failure record is 
explicitly set out for comparison, 
Having thus decimated the analytical structure of my book, Bliss goes 
on to denounce my sloppy research methods, and suggests my book is 
so unreliable that it must be assumed to be wrong, unless proven right. 
He states that he "seriously disagrees with the inferences drawn from an 
extraordinary 35%" of my sources. I fail to see what is so extraordinary 
about this figure. As I tried to make clear in my review of Michael Bliss's 
book, having examined largely the same sources that he did, I strongly 
disagree with about 100% of his inferences. Nonetheless let us examine 
a few of the supposed errors of interpretation in my book that Bliss con-
tends are patently unacceptable to "any reasonably knowledgeable Canad-
ian historian'', in which category he presumably places himself. 
Thus, no "reasonably knowledgeable Canadian historian" could 
contend there was no more Crown land in the Province of Canada suitable 
and available for settlement in 1850. I am very happy to have this error 
pointed out, and would suggest it is a pity that Michael Bliss cannot 
undertake to communicate it to Chester Martin who wrote in his Dominion 
Lands Policy (p. 389 in the original; p. 135 in the Carleton Library reprint): 
The truth was that Canada West had squandered its birthright. Whatever 
resources of eligible land remained in the hands of the speculator, the province 
itself was well-nigh bankrupt. The Commissioner of Crown Lands wrote in 1851 
that 'the supply of Crown lands for settlement is now exhausted.' 
Martin went on to discuss the resulting land fever in the province, and the 
beginnings of agitation to seize the Hudson's Bay Company territories. 
"The solution" .to the land shortage, he pointed out, "was to be found 
not in provincial policy, but in national federation charged with the 
sovereign task of settling an empire of Dominion Lands in the West." 
Then too J.M.S. Careless in his Brown of the Globe (Vol. I, p. 233) sug-
gests that one of the primary factors behind George Brown and Clear Grit 
agitation for the annexation of Ruperts' Land was Brown's "recognition 
that Canada West was filling up, in need of new lands to settle." He notes 
further (p. 229) that in 1855 "the Globe had reported the auctioning of the 
last block of wild land in the lake-hemmed western peninsula." The lands 
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themselves were underdeveloped, but they were alienated, and hence 
"new frontiers of settlement must be elsewhere". In this regard O.D. 
Skelton's discussion in "Canada Under Responsible Government" (Cam-
bridge History of the British Empire Vol. II, pp. 338-341) is also instructive. 
Another of my heinous errors of historical fact lay in the dating of 
Cartwright's first tariff. Thus a government which took office in 1873 
brought down a budget in March of 1874: that budget is referred to as 
Cartwright's 1873 budget at one point in the text, "repeated a few pages 
later as his 1973 budget". Naylor's scholarship is so sloppy that not merely 
years, not merely decades, but entire centuries vanish into the dust of 
time! 
Next comes my contention that Sir George Foster's career as Minis-
ter of Finance ran afoul of the chartered banks' anger in his attempt in 
1890 to impose a fixed reserve ratio. If Bliss does not wish to believe me 
he might check R.M. Breckenridge's The Canadian Banking System 
1817-1890 (Toronto 1894 p. 250) for a start. 
As to the contention that the CMA was vital in the campaign to 
overthrow the Ross government in Ontario in 1905, I arrived at such a 
conclusion by the following logic. Businessmen's attitudes towards 
government are decisively influenced by what governments do for busi-
ness. (In this perhaps Michael Bliss would disagree.) In early twentieth 
century Ontario the question of energy probably was at or near the top 
of the list of concerns of manufacturers. Organized manufacturers were the 
chief motivating force in the fight for public control of hydro-electric 
power. The question of Hydro was one of the most burning issues of the 
1905 campaign. The incumbent government was identified with the anti-
nationalization forces while the Conservative opposition sided with the 
pro-nationalization forces. The CMA, the principal manufacturers' political 
organization went on record publicly as favouring nationalization. I there-
fore conclude that the CMA's role, whether direct or indirect, was vital 
to the outcome of the campaign. 
My "unrecognizable" emphasis on dissenting manufacturers has 
already been discussed. It is worth stressing however that Bliss's efforts 
to denigrate the. factual reliability of the journals of organized farmers 
such as the Grain Growers Guide and Farmers' Advocate while touting 
these of organized manufacturers, Canadian Manufacturer and Industrial 
Canada, makes a mockery of his pretense to objectivity in social research. 
As to the works of W.T.R. Preston, I have yet to find a major episode 
cited therein for which some independent confirmation does not exist, 
be it the choice between Fielding and Cartwright for Minister of Finance, 
the Toronto Street Railway swindle, the operation of the North Atlantic 
combine, or the Great Gerrymander of 1882. 
Next Bliss attacks me for an error apparently committed by Merrill 
Denison. Denison's apparent misreading of the correspondence of E.H. 
King led to his contending that the Bank of Montreal intervened in the 
Confederation debates. My sin was to believe Denison, instead of checking 
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through all of the footnotes in his two volume history of the Bank of 
Montreal (which would involve, among other things, gaining access to the 
restricted archives of the bank) . As to Bliss's insistence that nowhere 
in King's letter to Galt is there any explicit reference to Confederation, 
Denison was quite aware of the fact. He remarked (La Premiere Banque 
au Canada Tome II, p. 133) that "King ne faisait aucune allusion a Ia 
Conference de Charlottetown. Ce n'etait pas necessaire: le sens de sa 
message ne pouvait echapper a Galt qui avait ete le premier Canadien 
eminent a proposer en 1858 une federation des provinces de I' Amerique du 
Nord brittanique . .. (I had only the French edition available at the time 
of writing this reply.) Moreover, if Bliss w~nts to contend that there 
was no link between the state of the government's debt to the Bank of 
Montreal and the Confederation proposal , he might have a difficult time 
convincing Alexander T. Galt who certainly implied such a connection in 
his letter to the Barings and Glyn, Mills of August 14, 1865, when he wrote: 
I have the honour to advise you that the Government ... are desirous if 
possible of postponing the introduction to Parliament of measures for the 
purpose of enabling them to meet this indebtedness to your firm and to the 
Bank of Montreal until the regular session of this legislature next winter, in 
the belief that from an abundant harvest and probably revival of trade, it will 
be a more favourable period for the contemplated arrangement. 
It is also believed that the proposed Confederation of the British North 
American provinces will, meantime, have made such progress as to enable the 
Government to determine upon the means of meeting their engagement in 
connection with the fiscal measures to be adopted in view of the early union 
of the colonies. 5 
Next Bliss queries "Where does Naylor find 'the fact that Travers 
contributed heavily to a $120000 testimonial to Finance Minister Fielding." 
We could start with Travers own sworn evidence which the Canadian 
Annual Review of 1911 (p. 312) reported as follows. 
Travers in his evidence on February 18th, stated that W.S. Calvert M.P., 
the Liberal Whip, had gone with him to urge Mr. Fielding to grant the certi· 
ficate, and that his intervention had been successful. 
Bliss further contends that Travers' statement is "used to imply corruption 
by Fielding." In fact it does nothing of the sort, if he interprets corrup-
tion here as the direct purchase of a favour. The sequence implied is 
clear. Travers paid into the fund; the Liberal Whip then worked on Field-
ing to get the certificate. Fielding himself may well have been quite una-
ware of the sources of contributions. There is nothing in my description 
of the events that implies that he was or was not aware. What it does 
imply is that Fielding, with the apparent urging of the Party Whip, granted 
a certificate of operation to a bank against the advice of senior officials 
and the President of the Canadian Bankers' Association himself - with 
catastrophic results. 
Next Bliss makes a foray into the 1904 election which is truly baffling. 
He states that ''undocumented assertions that the CPR was behind the La 
5 See CANADA, Sessional Papers, No. 35, 1866 for aJI of the corespondence on 
this question. 
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Presse affair of 1904 seem to be based on a rumour mentioned and denied 
by G.R. Stevens." Far from being undocumented there is an explicit 
footnote reference to the discussion in the Canadian Annual Review, the 
reference in the book was to events encompassing but much broader than 
simply the La Presse affair, and the treatment of the incident in R. Craig 
Brown's Borden Vol. I (pp. 80-81) implies that the CPR was more than 
just an interested spectator to the operation. 
To his contention that my discussion of the attitude of the Monetary 
Times to the tariff is a distortion of the paper's intent I would reply that 
the Monetary Times at the time of the editorial, seemed to have swung 
into the pro-tariff camp, that it cited without criticism the opinion of 
another newspaper that the tariff might induce American investment, that 
it favoured the establishment of new American branch plants, and that 
hence it connected the tariff and American investment in a positive and 
favourable way. The real problem here is that Bliss disagrees with the 
construction I put on the editorial. The interpretation one gives to a certain 
set of events or facts or opinion is conditioned by the sum total of one's 
research into the field. Interpretation of events, facts, and opinions is not 
only inevitable in historical research, it is essential. That is what differen-
tiates the social roles of the historian from that of the cypher-clerk. 
On the question of the 1884 loan Bliss is right in saying that part of 
the comments I imputed to Tilley were made by Tupper. He is wrong in 
suggesting I distorted them. The place in the line of argument where my 
own commentary replaces that of Tupper is clearly delineated with the 
words, "that is ... ". Furthermore, it is Michael Bliss that is responsible for 
the distortion of the article's intent, not I. He cites one phrase out of 
context to try to prove that I have completely falsified the record. Thus 
evidence I cited to prove Canada's credit was at a low ebb, the fact that 
its loans were selling at a ten percent discount, Bliss tried to make evi-
dence that the 1884loan was a high point in Canadian credit. The Monetary 
Times article that he cites itself is explicit on the point, stating of the loan, 
"the success was ample, but not overwhelming," and pointing out difficul-
ties in the flotation of Canadian securities abroad: All this conveniently 
vanishes from Bliss's view. Furthermore, even if the Monetary Times 
had made an unqualified judgement that the loan was a tremendous suc-
cess, (as Bliss wants to read it), rather than just satisfactory in light of 
generally poor credit conditions (as I insist), if Bliss wishes to seriously 
claim that the 1884 loan represented a high point in Canadian financial 
history when the loan was sold at a rate of discount of ten percent, that 
is a problem of his , lack of understanding of the mechanics of the bond 
market, not of my research. 
One last error for which he takes me to task, was indeed an error. 
A suggestion from George Stephen in 1885 recommending that an interest 
rate ceiling on mortgages on government lands in the west be lifted was 
misread by me in my notes as a letter from Macdonald to Stephen agreeing 
to lift the ceiling. This was a piece of sloppy research for which I deserve 
to be castigated. It is not so much a case that isolated errors are not 
inevitable and normal in historical research, but that any isolated errors 
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in a book like The History of Canadian Business will be picked up by the 
defenders of the status quo distribution of power and wealth and used 
to try to discredit the · entire work. Hence Bliss is right to take me to 
task for this error. 
That there are errors of detail and instances of misreading of sources 
in The History of Canadian Business is no surprise to me. One's inter-
pretation of events, and the inferences one draws from evidence changes 
as one's depth of understanding grows. Historical interpretation is obsolete 
from . the moment it finds its way into print. The second printing of The 
History of Canadian Business will contain many pages of clarifications, 
reinterpretations, and corrections, none of which so far has forced me to 
alter the major premises of the argument. Nor has my conviction, that 
despite various errors, exaggerations, and misinterpretations, the argument 
is basically sound, been altered in the slightest by Michael Bliss's criticisms. 
Criticisms should be motivated by a desire to initiate debate, to 
commence discussion of contentious issues; for only by open debate can 
knowledge be advanced. Michael Bliss's review of The History of Cana-
dian Business is, on the contrary, designed to close debate before it begins, 
and restore credibility to a bankrupt approach to business history of 
which he is an active exponent. 
Let us be frank. Throughout his review it ·is perfectly clear that 
Michael Bliss finds the tone with which and predelictions from which I 
write offensive insofar as they seem to presuppose venality and corruption 
as the norm among a set of individuals whom Bli"ss himself fondly typed 
in A Living Profit as "captains of industry" and "the men who were 
building the nation". In this regard I plead guilty. I concur completely 
with Gunnar Myrdal's axiom that the only meaningful objectivity in social 
research is that which makes the author's subjective biases explicit. There 
is no doubt as to where my predispositions lie. There is equally no doubt 
as to where Michael Bliss's are, despite his transparent efforts to appear 
objective. He clearly dislikes my presuppositions: I despise his. But this 
fundamental difference of ideological conviction between us is not a new 
type of phenomenon. The one North American historian whom I truly 
admi.re (which is not to suggest I do not respect others - but I admire 
only · one) was charged with the same type of biases in his historical writ-
ing that Michael Bliss would impute to mine. His reply to his critics will 
suffice as my final reply to Michael Bliss. In his History of the Great 
American Fortunes, Gustavus Myers pointed out that, 
The academician, strong in the audacity of his soporific mediocrity may 
say "This is no history; it lacks dispassionate style." If 'dispassionate style' 
consists of a dull string of dates, names, and phrases, with no glimpses of the 
roots of matters, nor a clear interpretation of causes and events, then this work 
does certainly want 'dispassionate style', and well it is that this defect is there. 
Who, indeed, does not know that there is no more effective medium for invent-
ing, telling, and perpetuating falsehoods than this same so-called 'dispassionate 
style.' 
